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want to divide the world into in groups and out groups. He suggests that
such tendencies can only be overcome through the spiritual sustenance
that genuine religion can provide.
At times Reitan claims that theism is the best guarantor of the ethicoreligious hope (51); at others he affirms that “more than one world view”
can satisfy it (185). Throughout the book he does not always stick to his
more modest claim, and sometimes argues as if his arguments for theism
are more decisive than they are. Moreover, connections between the three
principle reasons for belief he provides, the cosmological argument, the
argument from religious experience, and the argument from ethical hope,
are not explored in depth. The author does succeed in showing that attacks
on faith by the New Atheists are based on both a very superficial understanding of religion and a failure to recognize that there are, indeed, rational
grounds for faith. Moreover, Reitan does a refreshing job sketching what
such a rational faith, based on a moral commitment to the good, looks like.

A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley, by John Russell
Roberts. Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. xxii + 172. $55.00 (hardcover).
DALE JACQUETTE, University of Bern, Switzerland
A book, not as I had hoped, about ontology and organized crime; rather,
John Russell Roberts’s study of George Berkeley’s eliminative immaterialism, takes its title from Berkeley’s Philosophical Commentaries, I §405: “All
things in the Scripture which side with the Vulgar against the Learned
side with me also. I side in all things with the Mob.”
It is a puzzling statement. One, indeed, that has perplexed even those
critics sympathetic to Berkeley’s empiricism, if not to his project as a whole,
expressing his rejection of a non-thinking substratum of sensibilia and
mind-independent things existing “without the mind.” Roberts proposes
to explain the commonsense nature of Berkeley’s philosophy, and in the
process tackles many other related topics in the background of Berkeley’s
thought and in contemporary discussions of Berkeley and the problems
with which he was engaged.
In the first half of the book, Roberts offers historical background to
Berkeley’s immaterialism. In the second half, he applies the exposition of
Berkeley’s ideas presented in the first part to an interesting choice of historical and contemporary philosophical problems, including links to an
extended form of Daniel C. Dennett’s concept of the intentional stance,
the thorny issue of Berkeley’s relation to Malebranche’s occasionalism as
a solution to the causal interaction problem for Cartesian substance dualism, and Wilfrid Sellars’s distinction between the manifest and scientific
images. Woven through this development of interrelated topics is Roberts’s
motivation to extrapolate Berkeley’s positive doctrine of spirit, an important
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lacuna in Berkeley’s writings, despite his efforts to mount a decisive refutation of mind-independent materialism, but to which Berkeley devotes only
scant, virtually no, careful attention.
There is much to approve in Roberts’s inventive retelling of these topics
in Berkeley, but there are also some significant difficulties. For present
purposes, I shall highlight what I take to be some of the most noteworthy
problems in his interpretation.
Roberts’s debunking of the supposedly widely accepted but false because incomplete attribution to Berkeley of the ontological slogan Esse est
percipi appears to be directed at a straw man. We are never told in the text
who exactly is supposed to have made such an admittedly incorrect and
obviously inept attribution, beyond mentioning that beginning students
have often succumbed to this mistaken catchphrase. No relevant citations
are quoted at all, although it is not unthinkable that careless interpretations
of Berkeley’s philosophy have been made and will continue to be made by
misinformed commentators. Berkeley uses the phrase in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge I §3, but there he speaks explicitly only of the essence of ideas, when he says that ‘Their esse is percipi,’
rather than offering a Latin summary of all parts of his ontology in sum,
as is clear throughout the text, and especially in I §89. Many if not most
of Berkeley’s qualified readers have adopted some form of A. A. Luce’s
formulation that Esse est percipi aut posse percipere (To be is to be perceived
or a perceiver), and those who have focused on the Esse est percipi part of
the slogan can usually be charitably be understood as concentrating for
purposes of emphasis in a particular context on the ontology of ideas or
their combination into physical entities in Berkeley without losing sight of
the fact that perception implies a perceiver. This version, after all, agrees
favorably with Berkeley’s metaphysics of active minds entertaining passive ideas, and Roberts offers homage in the book’s Acknowledgements to
Luce as the “greatest of all Berkeley scholars” (iv). Roberts, however, never
credits Luce or any other previous writers as having properly understood
the two-part complementary nature of Berkeley’s ontology, whereas surely
those who have misunderstood Berkeley on this fundamental point must
surely be greatly in the minority compared to those who have read the
texts critically and taken Berkeley at his word on this central doctrine of
his metaphysics.
In what is certain to be widely regarded as the book’s most original
albeit controversial interpretation, Roberts appeals to Dennett’s concept
of the intentional stance and Sellars’s distinction between the manifest
and scientific image to contemporize the Berkeleyan theme that persons,
minds or spirits are ontically more basic than their ideas. While taking note
of important differences between Berkeley and Dennett, Roberts finds it
insightful to expand Dennett’s notion of intentional stance, extending it to
what he refers to as the “personal stance” and even the “religious stance.”
With respect to personal stance-taking in particular, Roberts writes: “According to Berkeley, the necessary precondition of having any kind of
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knowledge at all is the adopting of the personal stance—not to this or that
particular thing, but to reality as a whole” (83). The lengthy passage quoted
immediately following this pronouncement by no means supports Roberts’s
assertion. He continues: “external reality is an active thing, a mind, a will.
It is God” (84). By “external reality” Roberts evidently does not mean
what Berkeley would flatly reject as the “world without the mind,” but
rather the thinking entity within which the assemblages of passive ideas
that constitute the physical world are actively perceived. Still, it appears
strange to invoke a spatial relation, of inclusion or exclusion, here, since
for Berkeley all space and time, and hence all inside and outside, are
within the mind. Moreover, identifying God in particular as the “external reality” in Roberts’s idiom seems unwarranted, since Berkeley equally
regards finite human minds as realities existing “beyond” or “outside” of
the realm of physical objects construed as congeries of ideas, and equally
inscrutable to other minds, including God’s.
Roberts later writes, referring to Sellars’s concept of the manifest image in
relation to Berkeley’s ontology: “being a river or a tree is a way of being a person” (127). Roberts notes an important discrepancy between the Sellarsian
manifest image and Berkeley’s metaphysics, in that Sellars’s view allows
persons to be perceptible, which Berkeley explicitly denies. Roberts nevertheless concludes: “the key link between the manifest image and Berkeley’s
metaphysics lies not in a shared commitment to save the appearances but
rather in the deeper fact that in both Berkeley’s metaphysics and in the manifest image, the basic entities are persons” (128). The point is supposed to be
that both Berkeley and Sellars—when discussing the manifest as opposed to
the scientific image—make persons, minds or spirits, the fundamental objects of ontology. The fact that Sellars’s manifest image construes perceptible
rivers and trees as persons is correctly discounted and properly emphasized
by Roberts as an important difference. Indeed, Roberts devotes a large part
of the latter half of the book to establishing these differences, although he
thereby assumes a burden of argument that would never have been necessary had he not introduced this unlikely analogy in the first place. Since
the manifest image is supposed to be pre-scientific, Roberts thinks he has
established the vital link whereby Berkeley’s metaphysics can be properly
understood as commonsensical. Roberts, however, says nothing to counter
the obvious objection that persons, minds or spirits need not be ontically
more fundamental than their ideas, if, as in Schopenhauer and other later
idealists, spirits and ideas as designated in their distinct terminologies are
inter-implicative or inter-presuppositional. For these thinkers also there are
no ideas without minds—but equally there are no minds without ideas.
Which, then, ideas or minds, are supposed to be ontically more fundamental if one never exists without the other? Schopenhauer would insist that
neither is ontically more basic, and Roberts gives us no reason to believe
that Berkeley would disagree.
We might also wonder whether being pre-scientific is really akin to being
commonsensical. The fact that some cultures have encouraged Dennett-like
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intentional or personal stance-taking toward the physical world, reminiscent of tribal animisms and totemisms, and that they have considered such
attitudes to be commonsensical, does not even remotely relate, say, Druidism or native American attributions of personhood to natural objects and
forces, to anything Berkeley actually says or needs to say. Can we seriously
imagine Hylas, Philonous, or the man or woman on the street in eighteenthcentury Dublin or Cloyne, agreeing as a matter of common sense that rivers
and trees are persons, or even ways of being a person? For that matter, is
it reasonable to suppose that they would be inclined to admit that persons
are ontically more fundamental than the physical substances of which their
bodies are composed? A more orthodox, and, one might even say, more
common sense interpretation that derives directly from Berkeley’s own
explicit statements, understands his philosophy as commonsensical in the
less adventitious sense that, once the implications of mind-independent
materialism are fully explained, as both the Principles spells out and Three
Dialogues dramatizes in fictional interchange, no person of sound judgment
but lacking in philosophical prejudice or doctrinaire commitment would
be inclined to accept it. There is no deep mystery about the sense in which
Berkeley’s metaphysics is supposed to be commonsensical, a metaphysics
for the mob, and hence no motivation for going beyond the texts in search
of slim points of convergence with later thinkers like Sellars and Dennett.
Berkeley tells us simply, frequently, and in no uncertain terms, that common sense reasoning will assent to immaterialism once the conceptual
confusions in materialism are exposed.
Of further difficulties that might be criticized in Roberts’s argument,
from my perspective, I shall mention only these. Roberts equates the mind’s
faculties with its powers when he writes: “to say something is a ‘faculty’ of
the mind is simply to say that it is a ‘power’ of the mind” (103). Now this
is surely wrong. The faculty of calculation, for example, supports, among
other things, the power of addition and division, or ability to add and divide. We would nevertheless be hard-pressed to postulate distinct faculties
for every special type of calculation. Since addition ≠ division, however, the
power of addition ≠ the power of division. A person might happen to have
one without the other, like a machine programmed in limited dedicated
fashion as capable of adding but not dividing. It follows by transitivity
of identity and modus tollens that the faculty of calculation, though clearly
related to both the power of addition and the power of division, is itself
distinct from those powers. If both powers of addition and division were
identical to calculation, then, despite being distinct, they would, per impossibile, need to be identical to the faculty of calculation.
Roberts interestingly claims that Berkeley solves the problem of the
bundle theory of physical objects by appealing to the mind’s unity (28–33).
This too is a doubtful attribution, for which firm textual support is lacking in the book. Nor is it a particularly generous view to foist on the good
Bishop, because it is not at all clear how the mind’s unity is supposed to
help solve the original difficulty. Suppose that I see both a blue ball and a
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crimson cube. The relevant Berkeleyan ideas of blue, ball or sphere, crimson, and cube are then all collectively in my particular unified mind at a
certain point in time. What then unites the color blue with the ball shape
and not with the cube shape, and the color crimson with the cube shape
and not with the ball shape? The answer certainly cannot be my finite will,
which Berkeley and Roberts agree is insufficiently efficacious. God’s will
would better serve, but for this solution to have traction, we would need to
invoke Berkeley’s distinction between the ectypal and archetypal existence
of ideas respectively in finite minds and in God’s infinite mind. Roberts,
remarkably, has nothing to say about this crucial distinction in Berkeley’s
metaphysics of spirit, despite its being so manifestly essential to understanding Berkeley’s solutions to idealist puzzles about the sameness of
physical objects seen from different perspectives as consisting of different
ideas by different finite spirits at the same time.
Despite my misgivings, I recommend Roberts’s book as a thoughtful,
sympathetic approach to Berkeley’s philosophy in its development of a
descriptive rather than speculative metaphysics. Here I have focused primarily on what I see as some of the sticking points in Roberts’s historical
exposition. Roberts’s project is nonetheless to be commended for its contribution to making Berkeley’s anti-materialistic idealism more relevant
to today’s philosophical scene generally, and especially with respect to
Berkeley’s philosophy of religion. Certainly, Berkeley thought of his undermining of atheism to be every bit as important as his undermining of
skepticism, grounded in what he understood to be common sense. Anyone with serious interests in Berkeley’s philosophy and the eighteenthcentury European enlightenment will find much to appreciate in Roberts’s
historical commentary.

The Agnostic Inquirer: Revelation from a Philosophical Standpoint, by Sandra
Menssen and Thomas D. Sullivan. Eerdmans, 2007.
KAI-MAN KWAN, Hong Kong Baptist University
Menssen and Sullivan challenge the primacy of standard natural theology
in philosophy of religion. Menssen and Sullivan use the phrase “standard
natural theology” to refer to projects in natural theology that do not identify the content of revelatory claims as especially important evidence for
the existence of a good God (45). The basic idea is that one “cannot obtain
a convincing philosophical case for a revelatory claim without first obtaining a probable case for a good God” (52). Menssen and Sullivan believe
that standard natural theology is a handicapped project because it is not
working with a full database. For example, this kind of natural theology
“lands the agnostic inquirer in a quagmire of theodicy-building without
adequate resources: absent appeal to the content of revelatory claims, it is

